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A BETTER FINANCING SYSTEM?
The Death – and Possible Rebirth – of the Presidential Nomination
Public Financing Program
Richard Briffault*
Forthcoming in

THE BEST CANDIDATE: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION IN POLARIZED TIMES
(Eugene D. Mazo and Michael R. Dimino, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2020).
Abstract
In 1974 Congress authorized public funding for presidential nomination campaigns. Public
funding was crucial to Jimmy Carter’s nomination in 1976 and to Ronald Reagan’s nearly
successful campaign the same year, and continued to be an important factor in presidential
nomination contests for more than two decades after that. But no major candidate has used the
program since 2004. Due the program’s built-in limitations, changes in the nomination process,
and campaign finance developments, the program is completely irrelevant today.
It has been argued that the program isn’t really needed. Although one argument for public
funding is that promotes electoral competition the 2008 races in both parties and the 2016
Democratic nomination were hotly contested, and the races for the 2012 and 2016 Republican
nominations and the current 2020 Democratic campaign have had record numbers of candidates.
A second goal of public funding is to reduce the clout of large donors, but the last several
elections have been marked by a sharply increased role for small-dollar donors. Nonetheless, the
current private-funding system continues to pose major barriers to entry. Although small
donations have grown, the volume of very large donations has grown as well, and big donors,
big-donor-funded Super PACs, and wealthy self-funded candidates have a disproportionate role
in nomination campaign finance.
This chapter reviews the history of the presidential nomination public funding program, its
initial impact and the reasons for its subsequent collapse. It then examines the state and local
public funding systems that have drawn the participation of viable candidates, and increased both
competitiveness and the role of small donors. Based on the lessons of the failed federal system
and the successful state and local ones, it sketches out the reasons for and the elements of a reborn presidential nomination public funding program.

*

Joseph P.Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
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I.

Introduction
In the spring of 1974, the 31-year-old junior Senator from Delaware, Joseph R.

Biden, Jr., published a law review article in which he decried the traditional system of
privately-financed election campaigns. Private financing, Senator Biden contended,
“affords certain wealthy individuals or special interest groups the potential for exerting
a disproportionate influence over both the electoral mechanism and the policy-making
processes of the government.” Moreover, Biden urged, private funding poses an
obstacle to the candidacies of “individuals of moderate means” and so was at odds
with the “concept of American democracy [that] presumes that all citizens, regardless
of access to wealth, have equal access to the political process.” In addition, he argued
that private funding favored incumbents.1 To address the “Political Darwinism”2 of
private financing, Biden called on Congress to adopt a system of public funding for all
federal candidates.
Biden’s article grew out of a long tradition of treating public funding as integral to
campaign finance regulation. As far back as 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt, in
his Seventh Annual Message to Congress, had called for public funding of candidates,
and in the late 1960s and early 1970s Congress began to take tentative steps in that
direction.3 Congress created a Presidential Election Campaign Fund, with a mandate
initially limited to funding general election candidates. In October 1974, Congress went
further and authorized, starting in the 1976 election, the use of public funds to finance
the party nominating conventions and the campaigns of the candidates running for
their nominations.4 The pre-nomination public funding system differs from the general
election program, however. The general election system authorizes large flat grants

1

Joseph R. Biden, J., Public Financing of Elections: Legislative Proposals and Constitutional Questions, 69 NW. L. REV.
1, 2-3 (1974).
2
Id. at 2.
3
See Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: The Future of Public Financing, in DEMOCRACY BY THE
PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 103-04 & nn. 4-5 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner, eds.,
Cambridge U. Press 2018).
4
See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443 (Oct. 15, 1974), section 408, creating the
Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account, chapter 96 of subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
9031 et seq.
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for the major party nominees who agree to limit their spending to the government
grant. The pre-nomination program was designed to match small donations, so that
even with public funding, candidates would still need and be able to use private
contributions, albeit subject to a spending limit.
True to his principles, Senator Biden twice turned to the public funding program
when he ran for the Democratic presidential nomination. In the 1987-88 election, he
obtained $901,213 in federal matching funds, which were added to the $3.8 million in
private contributions he received in his short-lived campaign. Counting loans and
transfers from his other campaign committees, public funds accounted for about
22.3% of Biden’s total campaign spending.5 When Biden ran again in 2007-08, he
collected $2,033,471.83 in public funds, compared to less than $8.6 million in private
individual contributions to his campaign. With transfers and loans factored in, public
funds accounted for about 14% of Biden’s 2008 campaign spending. 6 Biden’s 2008
campaign also ended early, with him dropping out after placing fifth in the Iowa
caucuses held on January 3, 2008.
Biden’s 2020 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, however, is
not using public funds. Instead, the campaign is relying entirely on private
contributions, most likely with substantial support from independent committees. In
relying entirely on private funding this time, Biden is not alone. Every single one of the
nearly two dozen Democratic candidates is entirely financed by private contributions.
Nor is the absence of public funding in the 2020 race unusual. In 2016, exactly one of
the 23 major party primary contenders – across both parties – took public funds, with
both of the major party nomination winners – Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton –
wholly privately funded. So, too, both major party nominees in 2012 – Barack Obama
and Mitt Romney – and all the other 2012 contenders financed their nomination
campaigns from private funds; so did both major party nomination winners and the
runners-up in 2008. Indeed, the last Democratic candidate who used public funds in

5

Biden, Joseph, R. Jr., Financial Summary (1988), FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
https://www.fec.gov/data/candidate/P80000722/?cycle=1988&election_full=true.
6
Biden, Joseph, R. Jr., Financial Summary (2008), FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
https://www.fec.gov/data/candidate/P80000722/?cycle=2008&election_full=true.
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winning his party’s presidential nomination was Al Gore in 2000, and the last
successful publicly-funded candidate for the Republican nomination was Bob Dole in
1996.
It is not as if the public funding program was always a flop. Indeed, public funding
was an important factor in major party nomination campaigns in the first quartercentury after the program was adopted. Public funding was critical to the emergence
of Jimmy Carter in 1976 and to Ronald Reagan’s near-successful 1976 campaign,
which helped position him for his successful 1980 run. Public funding has also been
credited with shaping and sustaining nomination contests over several decades, by
helping to finance the candidates who were the principal challengers to their party’s
front-runners – George H.W. Bush in 1980, Gary Hart in 1984, Jesse Jackson in 1988,
Pat Buchanan in 1992, John McCain in 2000, and John Edwards in 2004.7
So, what happened? What caused the collapse of the presidential nomination
public funding program, beginning in 2000 and culminating in its complete irrelevance
by 2012? What have the consequences been for presidential nomination campaigns?
Should the presidential nomination public funding program be re-created, and if so,
how?
Part II of this chapter reviews the structure and legal framework of the presidential
nomination public funding system. It tracks the declining use of public funds over the
last two decades, and examines the reasons for the public funding program’s collapse.
Part III then considers whether a presidential nomination public funding program
should be re-created, and if so, how. Notwithstanding young Senator Biden’s concern
about the inability of candidates to raise the funds needed to mount competitive
campaigns without public funding, both parties in 2008, the Republicans in 2012, and
both parties in 2016 had highly competitive nomination contests, with the 2008
Democratic race and especially the Republican 2016 nomination campaign joined by
what were then record numbers of contestants. The 2020 Democratic nomination has

7

See CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE TASK FORCE ON FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS, SO THE VOTERS MAY CHOOSE . . .
REVIVING THE PRESIDENTIAL MATCHING FUND SYSTEM 2-4 (2005) (hereinafter “CFI 2005”).
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even more entrants than the Republicans did in 2016. Also, many of these candidates
managed to receive significant support from low-dollar donors. Nonetheless, most of
the truly competitive candidates have been largely dependent on large donors or, like
Mitt Romney in 2008 or Donald Trump in 2016, their personal wealth. With the
exception of Bernie Sanders in 2016, the candidates who relied primarily on low-dollar
donations usually exited their races early.
As a result, there remains a need for public funding to counter the role of large
donors and to help sustain the campaigns of outsider candidates. Moreover, the
growing experience of many states and cities with forms of public funding that depart
from and improve on the failed presidential model provide some guidance as to how
to create a workable reformed system.
Part IV will conclude by sketching out the elements necessary for a reinvigorated
public funding system.
II.

The Presidential Nomination Public Funding Program In Brief
A. Structure
The presidential nomination public funding program provides qualified

candidates with public funds by matching small individual donations. To qualify, a
candidate must raise at least $100,000, consisting of at least $5000 in individual
contributions – counting only $250 from any individual’s donation – from residents of
at least twenty states.8 These numbers have not been changed since the program’s
enactment in 1974. The program will then match on a dollar-per-dollar basis each
individual contribution the candidate receives, up to $250 per donor. The law sets a
spending limit – which is adjusted for inflation – as a condition for public funding and
also caps the amount of public funds the candidate can receive to half the spending
limit. In 2016 the pre-nomination spending limit was $48.07 million (although
additional funds could be spent for legal, accounting, and fundraising costs), so the
maximum grant in 2016 was effectively $24 million. By comparison, Democratic
nominee Hillary Clinton raised more than $500 million for her nomination campaign

8

26 U.S.C. § 9033 (b) (3), (4).
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in 2016, her runner-up Bernie Sanders raised $237 million, and Republican nominee
Donald Trump raised $350 million. Moreover, although the law provides for the
matching of any eligible contributions received starting the year before the year of the
presidential election, no matching payments can actually be made to a candidate until
the start of the year of the presidential election.9
The law also limits how much a candidate can spend in each state to
$200,000, adjusted for inflation, or to a specified inflation-adjusted amount based on
the number of voters in each state.10 That meant that in 2016 a publicly-funded
presidential contender would have been allowed to spend just $961,400 in the allimportant New Hampshire primary.11

In addition, the law limits a candidate to

spending no more than $50,000 in personal or immediate family funds.12 A candidate
ceases to be eligible for matching funds thirty days after he or she receives less than
ten percent of the vote in two consecutive primaries that the candidate contested,
unless he or she rebounds by obtaining twenty percent of the vote in another primary.
The program, along with general election public funding, is funded
voluntarily by taxpayers who choose to check-off a box on their tax form that will
dedicate a small portion of their tax liability to the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund. The check-off was originally $1 (or $2 for a couple filing a joint tax return) and
was raised to $3 (and $6 for couple filing jointly) in 1993.
As the one-to-one match and the cap on public funds at half the spending
limit indicate, the nomination public funding program was intended to be a hybrid of
public and private. Candidates need to raise private funds in order to receive public
funds, and the program assumes that private funds will constitute a significant portion
of campaign treasuries. Public funding was intended to reduce candidate
dependence on large donors, but not fully to replace private donations.
B. Constitutional Framework

9

26 U.S.C. § 9032 (6).
26 U.S.C. § 9035.
11
Presidential Spending Limits for 2016, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund_limits_2016.shtml.
12
26 U.S.C. § 9035.
10
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In the foundational case of Buckley v. Valeo,13 the Supreme Court sustained
both the general election and pre-nomination public funding programs, holding that
the public financing of campaigns advances the general welfare goals of reducing
“the deleterious influence of large contributions on the political process,” “facilitat[ing]
communication by candidates with the electorate,” and “free[ing] candidates from the
rigors of fundraising.”14 The Court went on to find that “public financing as a means
of eliminating the influence of large private contributions furthers a significant
government interest.”15 Buckley held that candidates could be required to accept
spending limits – which are otherwise unconstitutional -- as a condition for receiving
public funds.16 The Court also upheld the specific eligibility requirements for obtaining
pre-nomination campaign funding and rejected the contention that the matching funds
format favors wealthy voters and candidates.17
In subsequent cases – which focused on general election presidential public
funding, rather than the pre-nomination program – the Court rejected the argument
that candidates are somehow coerced into accepting public funds,18 but the Court in
1985 also invalidated a provision of the public funding law that limited independent
expenditures in support of or opposed to a publicly-funded candidate.19 As a result,
spending-limited publicly-funded candidates have to contend with both non-spendinglimited privately-funded opponents and non-spending-limited hostile independent
committees – although a publicly-funded candidate could also benefit from the
unlimited spending of a supportive independent committee.
In 2011, in a case known as Arizona Free Enterprise -- involving a state
public funding program – the Court held that the government could not provide a
publicly-funded candidate with additional public funds to respond to high levels of
spending by a privately-funded opponent or hostile independent committee.20 The
13

424 U.S. 1 (1976)
Id. at 91.
15
Id. at 97.
16
Id. at 57 n. 65, 107-08.
17
Id. at 105-08.
18
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 445 U.S. 955 (1980), aff’d Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F.Supp. 280
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
19
FEC v. Nat’l Cons. PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
20
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011).
14
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Court determined that such a “fair fight” or ”rescue” mechanism burdens the speech
of the candidate or committee whose spending triggered the payment of the additional
public funds, and that the burden is not justified by the interests that support public
funding.21 Although the presidential public funding program does not have such a
trigger mechanism, Arizona Free Enterprise limits the ability to make public funding
more attractive to candidates and so has important implications for any re-design of
the presidential nomination public funding program.
C. History: Rise, Decline, and Fall, 1976-2016
In the first six presidential election cycles after the public financing program
was enacted – 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 – virtually every major
presidential contender in both parties participated in the public funding program, and,
typically, federal matching funds constituted a significant fraction of their total
contributions. In 1976, Jimmy Carter’s $8 million in private individual contributions
was matched by $3.6 million in public funds. On the Republican side, a third of Gerald
Ford’s primary receipts and 40% of Ronald Reagan’s funding consisted of public
funds.22 The funds were particularly valuable at the start of the campaign season to
the virtually unknown Jimmy Carter and to Ronald Reagan, who was challenging an
incumbent president of his own party, as each had less than $50,000 on hand before
the public funds began to flow at the beginning of 1976.23 Again, in 1980, both for
Reagan and his principal opponent George H.W. Bush on the Republican side, and
for Carter and his challenger Senator Ted Kennedy on the Democratic side, matching
payments accounted for about a third of their total funds.24 The payment of public
funds at the start of 1980 has been credited with saving Bush from financial
elimination and enabling him to become the runner-up to Reagan and Reagan’s pick
for vice-president.25
The pattern continued through the 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections, with
both major party nomination winners and their principal opponents taking public
21

Id. at 736-55.
MICHAEL J. MALBIN & BRENDAN GLAVIN, CFI’S GUIDE TO MONEY IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: 2016 IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT, at 27
(Table 1-1) (Camp. Fin. Inst. 2018).
23
See CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 2.
24
MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 22, at 27 (Table 1-1).
25
See CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 3.
22
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funds.26 So, too, the infusion of public funds at the start of the election year enabled
candidates who were virtually out of cash – Gary Hart (1984), Jesse Jackson (1988),
Paul Tsongas (1992), Pat Buchanan (1992) – to keep in their races and mount major
challenges against the frontrunners.27 In this period, matching funds accounted for a
quarter to a third of the war chests of participating candidates.28 Things began to
change in 1996. President Clinton’s Democratic nomination was essentially
uncontested, but he still participated in the public funding program, and public funds
accounted for almost one-third of his primary period receipts. On the Republican side,
however, although the ultimate nomination winner Bob Dole participated in the
primary matching program, as did his principal runner-up Pat Buchanan, Dole’s other
main opponent, millionaire Steve Forbes, opted out of the program and committed
nearly $40 million of his own funds to his campaign, thereby virtually equaling Dole’s
combination of private contributions and public funds.29 By winning two early
primaries and ultimately about 11% of the primary vote, 30 Forbes became the first
serious primary candidate to opt out of public funding since the program was
adopted.31
In 2000, the initial crack in the public funding program began to widen, as
George W. Bush became the first candidate to win a major party nomination without
public funding since the public funding program was enacted. To be sure, public
funding enabled John McCain to mount a serious challenge to Bush,32 winning seven
primaries and 31% of the Republican primary vote.33 But Bush’s $103 million in

26

MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 22, at 26 (Table 1-1).
CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 3.
28
Michael J. Malbin, Small Donors, Large Donors and the Internet: The Case for Public Funding After Obama,
CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, at 5 (2009),
http://www.cfinst.org/president/pdf/PresidentialWorkingPaper_April09.pdf.
29
CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 25 (Table 1-1).
30
1996 Republican Party presidential primaries, WIKIPEDIA (last visited May 22, 2019),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Republican_Party_presidential_primaries.
31
In 1980, John Connally, the former Governor of Texas and Secretary of the Treasury, ran for the Republican
presidential nomination without taking public funds. Although he spent $11 million on his campaign, he did not
win a single primary and secured the support of only a single delegate. See John Connally, WIKIPEDIA (last visited
May 22, 2019), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Connally.
32
See CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 3
33
See 2000 Republican Party presidential primaries, WIKIPEDIA (last visited May 22, 2019)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Republican_Party_presidential_primaries.
27
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private primary contributions was more than double McCain’s total receipts; indeed,
it was more than double the pre-nomination campaign receipts of any major party
candidate in the preceding quarter-century.34 Although both major Democratic
contenders – Al Gore and Bill Bradley -- opted to take matching funds, which
accounted for roughly 30% of their receipts,35 the writing was on the wall. In 2004,
the winners of both major party nominations – George W. Bush and John Kerry -declined public funding. Each raised well over $200 million, or far more than he could
have raised if he had chosen to rely on public funding. Again, public funding sustained
a number of other Democratic contenders through the early primaries, and public
funding arguably enabled John Edwards to become Kerry’s longest-lasting opponent,
first runner-up, and vice presidential pick.36 But 2004 was the last election in which
public funding played any significant factor in the party nomination contests.
In 2008, the two leading Democratic contenders – Barack Obama and
Hillary Clinton – opted out of public funding, as did all of the principal Republican
candidates – John McCain, Mitt Romney, Rudy Giuliani, Rand Paul, and Mike
Huckabee. To be sure, a handful of prominent Democratic contenders – John
Edwards, Joe Biden, Christopher Dodd, and Dennis Kucinich -- qualified for public
funds, but only Edwards came in as high as second in any state primary or caucus
contest. With the publicly funded candidates mostly dropping out early, the total
allocation of matching funds in 2008 came to just $20 million, or less than 2% of the
$1.2 billion raised by all of the presidential hopefuls in the nomination phase of that
year’s election.37 In 2012, the public funding program ceased to play any role in the
pursuit of the major party nominations.38 Matching funds payments dropped to a little
more than $350,000 in 2012, with all the funds going to candidates for third party
nominations. In 2016, the program played a marginally larger role, with Maryland
Governor Martin O’Malley, a candidate for the Democratic nomination, qualifying for

34

See CFI 2018, supra note 22, at 25-27 (Table 1-1).
Id. at 25.
36
See CFI 2005, supra note 7, at 3-4.
37
See John C. Green & Diana Kingsbury, Financing the 2008 Presidential Nominating Campaigns, in FINANCING THE
2008 ELECTION: ASSESSING REFORM 86, 96-97 (David B. Magleby & Anthony Corrado eds., Brookings Inst. Press 2011).
38
See Presidential Campaign Receipts Through December 31, 2012, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2012/tables/presidential/Pres1_2012_24m.pdf.
35
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public funds, and obtaining a little over $1 million in matching funds, or about onesixth of his campaign receipts. O’Malley, however, placed a very distant third-place
in the Iowa caucuses and dropped out of the race early. By comparison, the two
leading Democratic contenders, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, together raised
in excess of $630 million in private contributions.39 None of the Republican
candidates took private funds.40

D. Why Did Public Funding Fail?
The public funding system failed for two reasons, which are essentially two sides
of the same coin: Public funding became incapable of providing candidates with enough
money to cover the drastically increased costs of the major party nomination contests,
and, conversely, it became much easier to raise the necessary funds from private
sources. More fundamentally, public funding fell victim to the interplay of the dramatic
changes in the nomination process, developments in the campaign finance system, and
public funding’s own unchanged rules.
Turning first to the failure of public funding to keep up with the costs of running for
a major party nomination, perhaps the most significant development in the four decades
since public funding was adopted is the changed nature of the nomination contest itself.
In 1972, the last election before public funding was enacted, Democratic candidates
contested just 21 primaries and 11 caucuses,41 and just 61% of Democratic convention
delegates and 54% of Republican delegates were chosen in primaries.42 By 1976, the
percentage of delegates chosen in primaries had risen to 73% and 68%, respectively.43
Those numbers continued to rise in the 1980s, so that by 1988, virtually every jurisdiction

39

See Presidential Table 1: Presidential Pre-Nomination Campaign Receipts Through December 31, 2016, FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION (April 7, 2017),
https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/presidential/PresCand1_2016_24m.pdf.
40
Id.
41
1972 Democratic presidential primaries,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Democratic_Party_presidential_primaries.
42
See Michael J. Malbin, A Public Funding System in Jeopardy: Lessons from the Presidential Nomination Contest of
2004, in THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY POLITICS AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 220 (Michael J. Malbin,
ed., Rowman & Littlefield 2006).
43
Id.

11

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499725

conducted a primary or caucus and used these contests to select or bind convention
delegates.
Not only did the number of state contests rise sharply, but primaries were
increasingly frontloaded. In 1972, the New Hampshire primary took place on March 7. In
2004, it was held on January 27. In 2008, it was on January 8. Moreover, whereas in the
1970s, primaries were sequenced “at what now seems like a leisurely pace,”44 with major
contests often several weeks apart, starting in 1984 and 1988, they began to be bunched
together in ever-more “super” Tuesdays. In 2004, there were eighteen contests in
February and another ten on March 2, when John Kerry effectively secured the
Democratic nomination.45 In 2008, there were twenty-three Democratic contests and
twenty-one Republican contests on a single day – and a very early day at that, February
5.46 Although the Obama-Clinton race continued until late spring, by March 4, 2008, John
McCain had effectively triumphed over a crowded Republican field and secured his
party’s nomination.47
The public funding program has become an anachronism. Provisions that worked
in the 1970s and 1980s are simply incapable of handling the timing, pace, and intensity
of the twenty-first century nomination process. The small size of the grant and the low
spending limit were not designed for a system with more than fifty state campaigns (as
well as campaigns in the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions that select convention
delegates). The prohibition on the payment of funds before January 1 of the election year
fails to deal with the early dates of the first contests and their crucial importance in framing
the race. The state-specific spending limits make no sense, particularly when lowpopulation (and low-spending limit) states like Iowa and New Hampshire loom so large in
the nomination calendar. These limits are also fundamentally at odds with the national
scope of the Super Tuesday elections.

44

Id. at 221.
See John C. Green, Financing the 2004 Presidential Nomination Campaigns, in FINANCING THE 2004 ELECTION, at 9697, 115-17 (David B. Magleby, Anthony Corrado & Kelly D. Patterson, eds., Brookings Inst. 2006).
46
Green & Kingsbury, supra note 37, at 89.
47
2008 Republican presidential primaries, WIKIPEDIA (last visited May 22, 2019),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Republican_Party_presidential_primaries.
45
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The law’s limit on total pre-nomination spending poses other problems. One is the
so-called “bridge period.” With the candidates furiously spending in the crucial early
contests, a winning candidate is likely to hit the spending limit – and be barred from further
campaign expenditures -- months before his or her party’s national convention. This is
essentially what happened to Bob Dole in 1996. Pushed by the intense spending by his
privately-funded (and largely self-funded) primary opponent Steve Forbes, Dole had “to
spend almost the legal limit during the primaries, leaving him legally unable to raise and
spend money from late March until the convention in July.”48 This left Dole vulnerable to
an intensive negative advertising campaign in the March-July period by his general
election opponent, President Bill Clinton,49 who, running unopposed for re-nomination,
had accumulated a substantial war chest that included more than $13 million in matching
funds.50 Dole’s inability to spend during this bridge period between winning the primaries
and being formally nominated at the national convention is one of the factors that led
George W. Bush to opt out of public funding in 2000,51 and forced John Kerry to make a
similar decision in 2004.
Of course, not every nomination fight is settled early enough to create a bridge
period problem. The nomination battles between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in
2008 and between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders in 2016 truly went the distance,
with hotly contested primaries and caucuses happening as late as June. There is no way
Clinton and Sanders could have competed as long and as intensely as they did under an
aggregate primary spending ceiling of less than $50 million. Indeed, Sanders spent nearly
five times that amount, and Clinton more than ten times the primary spending limit. 52 On
the Republican side, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, and Marco Rubio all spent

48

Wesley Joe & Clyde Wilcox, Financing the 1996 Presidential Nominations: The Last Regulated Campaign?, in
FINANCING THE 1996 ELECTION 57 (John C. Green, ed., M.E. Sharpe 1999).
49
Id. at 58-59.
50
CFI 2018, supra note 22, at 26 (Table 1-1).
51
See John C. Green & Nathan S. Bigelow, The 2000 Presidential Nominations: The Costs of Innovation, in FINANCING
THE 2000 ELECTION 58 (David B. Magleby, ed., Brookings Inst. Press 2002).
52
Presidential Table 2: Presidential Pre-nomination Campaign Disbursements through December 31, 2016, FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION (April 7, 2017),
https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/presidential/PresCand2_2016_24m.pdf.

13

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499725

above the public funding spending limit,53 even though both Carson and Rubio had
withdrawn from the race by early March.
Contemporary nomination contests simply cost far too much for candidates to be
able to abide by the aggregate primary spending limit. With the matching fund payments
statutorily capped at half the spending limit, the program provides far too little money to
enable a candidate to fund the kind of campaign needed to win a nomination. As one
leading campaign finance scholar pointed out a decade ago, “the cost of running has far
outpaced the amount a candidate is allowed to spend.”54
The other side of the coin is that it has become far easier for candidates to obtain
private funds or to benefit from the spending of wealthy supporters. One not fullyappreciated consequence of the McCain-Feingold law (formally the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act or “BCRA”) is that in exchange for placing limits on political party soft money,
the law doubled the contribution limits for private donations, and then indexed them for
inflation. In other words, the cap on individual contributions, which had been $1,000 per
donor per election from 1976 through 2000, jumped to $2,000 for the 2004 election, and
has been set at $2,800 for the 2020 election. However, the law increased neither the size
of the contribution that could be matched with public funds nor the match ratio. As a result,
private financing has become far more attractive relative to public funding.
Candidates also have become more adept at raising large amounts of private
contributions. George W. Bush in 2000 demonstrated what the aggressive use of
bundlers – individuals who commit to raising the maximum amount of individual donations
from a large number of friends and associates – can accomplish. Bush recruited 226
“Pioneers” who each raised $100,000 or more from donors who gave the then-maximum
of $1,000 per person. These bundlers alone accounted for a quarter of Bush’s prenomination funds.55 Bush did even better in 2004, with two tiers of bundlers – Rangers
who brought in $200,000 or more, as well the $100,000 Pioneers – raising $77 million or
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30% of his total donations.56 Obama, Clinton, and McCain in 2008,57 and Obama and
Romney in 2012, also benefited significantly from fundraising by bundlers.58
The numbers just cited referred only to contributions collected by a candidate’s
official campaign committee. Candidates have other means of benefiting from large
private donations. A prospective presidential candidate may defer entering the race and
engage in a protracted “testing the waters” period, using a leadership PAC, a supportive
albeit nominally independent political committee, or a friendly social welfare organization
to pay for travel, public appearances, fundraising, political research, polling, and generally
laying the groundwork for a campaign.59 A leadership PAC is a political action committee
established or controlled by a candidate that is supposed to be used to support the
campaigns of other candidates but can be used to cover some of the expenses of the
candidate who controls the PAC. A donor can give up to $5,000 per year to a leadership
PAC – including non-election years -- which is considerably higher than the cap on
donations to the candidate’s campaign committee, and, of course, donors can give to
both. As a leading study of the “testing the waters” provision found, “[h]istorically,
leadership PACs have been very popular vehicles for federal officeholders testing the
waters of a presidential campaign.”60
Outside groups, such as 527 organizations and 501(c)(4) organizations have
played an important role in funneling big money into nomination campaigns at least since
the 2000 election.61 Both types of organizations take their names from provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code that exempt their income from taxation. 527s are dedicated to
political activities; they can accept unlimited contributions and engage in unlimited
independent spending, but they are subject to disclosure requirements. 501(c)(4)’s are
supposed to be primarily non-electoral, but can engage in some election-related activities.
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However, even their technically non-electoral spending may focus on issues that can
affect elections. They can accept unlimited contributions and make unlimited
expenditures – subject to the requirement that their expenditures are primarily nonelectoral – but they are not required to disclose their donors. Initially, most of the spending
by these outside groups occurred in the so-called bridge period and was aimed either at
helping the presumptive nominee of the party that the outside group supported or
attacking the presumptive nominee of the other party;62 in 2008, however, outside money
was also a factor in the internecine Democratic struggle between Obama and Clinton.63
In 2012, the role of outside money in nomination campaigns took a quantum leap
with the emergence of the Super PAC. In 2010, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that donations to political committees that engage only in
independent spending – that is, spending that is not coordinated with any candidate –
cannot be limited.64 With the Supreme Court having previously held that such
independent spending could not be limited, the D.C. Circuit decision – soon followed by
other courts of appeals65 – meant that independent-expenditure-only groups could both
take and spend money to expressly support or oppose candidates without limits. That is
what makes them “super.” The Federal Election Commission subsequently determined
that even a group that makes donations to candidates can become “super” if it creates a
segregated account that makes only independent expenditures; it can then accept
unlimited donations to that account.66
In 2012, virtually every major candidate had a supportive Super PAC working for
him or her. Typically established and run by operatives who had previously been on the
candidate’s government or campaign staff, the fundraising of these Super PACs made it
clear that the contributions they received would be used to advance the political fortunes
of that candidate. Indeed, candidates were free to fundraise for their supportive Super
PACs, and did so. Super PACs were crucial to the campaigns of many of the 2012
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Republican contenders, particularly Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, Jon
Huntsman, and Rick Perry.67 Indeed, Newt Gingrich’s affiliated Super PAC raised more
money than his official campaign committee.68 And these Super PACs were funded by
very large contributions: The vast majority of the contributions to the Obama, Romney,
Gingrich, Santorum, Huntsman and Perry Super PACs came in amounts of $50,000 or
more.69
Super PACs were also major players in 2016. Jeb Bush’s Super PAC raised a
primary season record $121.1 million dollars – or nearly four times the sum donated to
his campaign committee.70 The sum is particularly striking as Bush effectively withdrew
from the race after coming in fourth in the South Carolina primary in late February. The
Super PACs supporting Marco Rubio, Scott Walker, Chris Christie, Carly Fiorina, Rick
Perry, Bobby Jindal, and George Pataki all raised more money than did the formal
campaign committees of these candidates, and the receipts of the Super PACs
supporting Ted Cruz and John Kasich closely approached the volume of donations to
those candidates’ official committees.71 On the Democratic side, although there was no
Super PAC supporting Bernie Sanders, the one supporting Hillary Clinton raised $106.4
million, or more than a quarter of the aggregate of what her campaign committee and the
Super PAC collected.72
Of course, not all of the dramatic expansion in private money funding of
presidential nomination campaigns over the past two decades has come from large
donations. The last several presidential nominating contests have witnessed a
remarkable surge in the number of low-dollar donors. Federal law requires candidates to
obtain the name, address and other information from any donor of more than $200.
Donors who give $200 or less are known as "unitemized donors.” Due in significant part
to the growing and increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet for fundraising,
campaigns in the twenty-first century have raised unprecedented amounts from
67
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unitemized donors. John McCain’s 2000 campaign was the first to turn to the Internet;
Howard Dean in 2004 was the first to rely primarily on the Internet, and to forego public
funds while so doing; and Barack Obama was the first successful candidate to make
significant use of the Internet to raise low-dollar donations. Although Internet fundraising
requires a substantial start-up investment in personnel, equipment infrastructure, data
collection, and database maintenance, once underway it is a relatively cheap way of
reaching large numbers of potential small donors and is certainly far more cost-effective
than earlier fundraising targeted at small donors such as direct mail. About 30% of the
funds Obama received in the 2008 primary season came from unitemized donors.
Although Howard Dean in 2004 received an even higher percentage of his funds from
small donors (38%), and Rand Paul in the 2008 Republican primaries received an even
higher

fraction

(39%),

Obama

obtained

an

impressive

$122 million in small donations73 – nearly triple what he could have obtained in public
funds. Obama raised even more in small donations in 2012 -- $147 million – while the
campaign committees of most of the Republican also-rans in 2012 – Rand Paul, Newt
Gingrich, Rick Santorum, Herman Cain, and Michelle Bachman – were also heavily smalldonor funded, although given their limited fundraising success they might have been
better off participating in the public funding system.74
Small donations were also a big factor in 2016. Bernie Sanders was able to go the
distance against Hillary Clinton, campaigning until June, with 44% of his funds (almost
$100 million) coming from unitemized donors. Even one-quarter of Clinton’s funds (almost
$64 million) came from such low-dollar donors. On the Republican side, a third or more
of the value of individual contributions to the Donald Trump, Ben Carson, Rand Paul,
Carly Fiorina, Scott Walker, and Mike Huckabee campaigns came from low-dollar donors,
although the aggregate amounts were relative small, as these campaigns either raised
relatively little money (Paul, Fiorina, Walker, Huckabee) or, in Trump’s case, relied more
on self-funding than donors.75
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Trump’s successful campaign for the 2016 Republican nomination is a useful
reminder that the amount of money a candidate has or spends is not dispositive of the
election’s outcome. Three of the candidates Trump defeated – Jeb Bush, Ted Cruz, and
Marco Rubio – spent more, or had more spent on their behalf than he did. 76 Trump, of
course, benefited tremendously from his pre-campaign celebrity and the massive amount
of free media coverage he received.77 And he did give or lend more than $66 million to
his campaign, which was roughly half of his total pre-nomination receipts.78 Indeed, he
was roughly 75% self-funded during the crucial early primary phase of the contest.79 His
self-financing was far more than he – or any candidate – could have obtained from public
matching funds, or than he would have been allowed to spend in private and matching
funds together if he had opted for public funds.
III.

Going Forward: Should Public Financing Be Saved, and If So, How?
A. Why Public Funding?
There are reasons to question whether public funding should be re-established. A

primary goal of public financing is to reduce barriers to entry and thereby make elections
more competitive by making it easier for candidates to raise the money necessary to
compete. Yet, the recent privately-funded presidential nomination contests have been
marked by intensive competition. In 2012, there were nearly a dozen Republican
candidates who contested one or more primaries. In 2016, there were so many
Republican candidates that they had to be divided into two groups for the pre-primary
debates. There were a dozen who contested at least one primary, and eight who raised
more than $10 million in individual contributions (not counting their supportive Super
PACs).80 On the Democratic side, although the initial 2016 field of six quickly dropped to
two, the Clinton-Sanders race was hotly and closely contested throughout the entire
primary season. Moreover, as of late spring 2019, there are a record number of
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candidates for the 2020 Democratic nomination -- nearly two dozen. There has been no
lack of competition for the nominations of the major parties when they do not have
incumbents seeking reelection.
A second major justification for public financing is to democratize campaign finance
by reducing the impact of large and powerful donors and increasing the role of ordinary
voters. Again, as already noted, elections over the last two decades have been marked
by a striking increase in the number of donors and, especially, in the role of low-dollar
donors. More than 784,000 people made itemized donations – that is, donations of more
than $200 -- to contenders for presidential nominations in 2007-08. Although that number
dropped to 505,000 in 2012 (when there was no Democratic contest, although President
Obama still received contributions), it returned to almost 735,000 in 2016.81 Although the
precise number of unitemized donors (giving $200 and under) is not recorded, they
accounted for roughly 24% of the value of individual donations to the candidates of both
parties in 2008; 25% of the value of individual donations to the Republican candidates in
2012; and 33% of the individual donations to the candidates of both parties in 2016. 82 As
previously noted, Bernie Sanders received 44% of his contributions from low-dollar
donors. For Sanders, at least, participation in the public funding system would have
reduced his ability to raise small donations and would have capped the ability of small
donors to participate in his campaign. Moreover, in the opening months of the 2019-20
campaign, many of the Democratic contenders have emphasized the importance of small
donors to their campaign or have asserted that they will not turn to lobbyists, interest
groups, or Super PACs for support. The Democratic National Committee has also
determined that the ability to raise contributions from a large number of donors will be
one of the criteria for eligibility to participate in candidate debates.83
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Despite these developments, the traditional arguments for public financing, as
articulated by Joe Biden in 1974 – and Theodore Roosevelt in 1907 – still apply to the
presidential nomination contests. First, limited access to funds may still operate to limit
the ability of candidates to compete. In 2016, there was no incumbent in the Democratic
contest, but the six declared candidates quickly dropped to two as none other than Clinton
and Sanders were able to raise the necessary funds. Similarly, in the 2012 Republican
contest, lack of funds drove a number of contenders out of the race early, and crippled
the ability of Romney’s principal rivals – Gingrich and Santorum – to compete.84 It is less
clear what role money played in the 2016 Republican race, in which Trump benefited
enormously from free media and a number of his opponents, particularly Bush, Cruz, and
Rubio were very well-funded. Nonetheless, several of the candidates in that large field,
such as Christie and Huckabee, clearly lacked the funds necessary to mount sustained
campaigns.85 To be sure, it’s not clear the current public funding system could have done
much for these candidates. Democrat Martin O’Malley did participate in the public funding
program in 2016, much as Joe Biden, Christopher Dodd, and John Edwards did in 2008,
and all were out of the running early in the primary season. The quality of the candidates
and the dynamic of the particular election matter as much as the financing system. But a
lack of adequate candidate funding tends to constrain the choices available to voters.
Moreover, while the volume of small donations has grown tremendously since the
turn of the century, the volume of very large donations has also grown significantly. In
2008, individuals who each donated $1,000 or more to a presidential nomination
campaign collectively provided candidates with nearly $500 million and accounted for
more than half of the dollar value of all donations to candidates in each party’s contest.
For all of his success with small donors, Barack Obama received 44% of his individual
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primary campaign donations from $1,000+ donors, and John McCain received an even
more significant 71% of his individual primary contributions from $1,000+ donors. Indeed,
27% of Obama’s donations ($87.3 million) and 49% of McCain’s donations ($60.8 million)
came from individuals who “maxed out” – that is, they gave the maximum legally
permissible amount. Obama’s receipts from maxed-out donations was almost as large as
what he obtained from unitemized low-dollar donors.86 Moreover, as Michael Malbin has
pointed out, the very large donations that Obama received during the so-called “invisible
primary” period – that is, the first three quarters of 2007, long before any actual primary
votes were cast – were crucial in establishing him as a serious candidate. His small
donations surged later, only as he began to win primaries.87
Large donors were prominent again in 2012. On the Republican side, 56% of the
value of individual donations came from individuals who gave $1,000 or more, with 40%
coming from maxed-out donors who gave $2,500 each. The nomination winner Mitt
Romney actually obtained 55% of his individual contributions from maxed-out donors.88
The significance of large donors is even greater once Super PAC funds are taken into
account. This makes sense, as an important reason an individual may give to a Super
PAC is that he or she has maxed out on the direct contribution to the candidate. Large
donors – actually, very large donors, using a $50,000 minimum contribution threshold –
provided an average of 82% of nomination campaign Super PAC contributions, including
87% of the contributions to the Romney-, Santorum-, and Perry-linked Super PACs, 88%
of the Huntsman-supporting Super PAC, and 99% of the pro-Gingrich Super PAC. On the
Democratic side, 91% of the funds contributed to the Obama-affiliated Super PAC came
from $50,000+ donors.89
Similarly, in 2016, large ($1,000+) donors accounted for 55% of Hillary Clinton’s
pre-nomination contributions; 40% came from maxed-out donors. On the Republican
side, the candidates received on average 41% of their individual contributions from large
donors and 25% from maxed-out donors, and that takes into account Donald Trump, who
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received a below-average share of his contributions from large donors. A number of the
other major contenders – including Rubio, Bush, and Kasich – received between 60%
and 87% of their funds from large donors, and 36% to 72% from maxed-out donors.90
And, again, many of the candidates – Bush, Clinton, Rubio, and Cruz in particular –
received massive support from Super PACs, which are financed almost entirely by very
large donors.91 Large donors often hold views on economic or social issues that diverge
from those of average party voters,92 so that candidate – and, ultimately, officeholder -dependence on large donors can skew party policies and government actions away from
the preferences of the voters.
In short, despite the surge in the number of donors, and especially of low-dollar
donors, in recent presidential elections, the impact of the very wealthy may actually be
greater than ever. Looking at federal elections in the aggregate – that is, congressional
and presidential elections together – one study found that although in the 2000 election
cycle just 73,926 individuals accounted for half of all donations, in 2016, a mere 15,810
individuals provided half of all campaign money.93 The longstanding goals of public
financing – promoting competition by enabling serious candidates to obtain the funds they
need to sustain their campaigns, reducing the dependence of candidates (and future
officeholders) on large donors, and reducing the disproportionate impact of the wealthy
on public policy94 – remain unmet by our twenty-first century private nomination campaign
finance system. But given the unhappy experience with the current public financing
system, can a system be created that accomplishes public funding’s goals?
B. The State and Local Public Financing Experience
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Even as the federal presidential public financing system has gone into eclipse,
states and local governments have created new programs that have had some success
in advancing public funding’s goals. Currently, at least fourteen states provide some form
of public financing option for campaigns,95 and another dozen local governments – most
prominently New York City, Los Angeles, and Seattle – have implemented or are in the
process of implementing some system of public funding for candidates.96 These programs
take a variety of forms, but three patterns dominate: (i) “clean money” programs that
provide a qualifying candidate with a grant intended to fully fund the candidate’s
campaign; (ii) matching funds programs that, like the current presidential primary system,
provide public funds that match small donations but that unlike the presidential system
provide funds that are a multiple of the matched small donation; and (iii) voucher
programs, under which voters are given vouchers that have a certain value, which they
can donate to candidates, who then redeem the vouchers for public funds.97
A number of these programs have significant track records. The “clean elections”
systems in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine have been in place for several election cycles
– Maine’s program was adopted in 1996, Arizona’s in 1998, and Connecticut’s in 2006 -and have been credited with increasing the competitiveness of elections, increasing the
number of candidates able to run for office, diversifying the candidate pool, expanding
voter participation in the campaign finance process, and reducing the burdens of
fundraising.98 New York City’s multiple-match system has also been praised for similarly
expanding the number and diversity of candidates, increasing electoral competition, and,
especially, broadening and diversifying the donor pool. New York’s experience has also
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shown the significance of the match rate. Over nearly three decades, New York City has
increased the match rate from 1-to-1 to 2-to-1 then 3-to-1, 4-to-1, and in the three most
recent general elections 6-to-1, while lowering the maximum matched contribution from
$1,000 to $250 and finally to $175.99 In future elections, the match rate will rise to 8-to-1,
and the maximum matchable amount will go back to $250. These changes have
increased candidate participation in the program, while diversifying the donor pool. In the
most recent New York City elections in 2017, 84% of candidates in the primaries
participated. The program enjoyed a high level of support, and the participating
candidates won the three city-wide elected positions, four of the five borough
presidencies, and 36 of 51 City Council seats. Moreover, the program succeeded in
stimulating low-dollar contributions for participating candidates, and in generating
contributions from neighborhoods around the city.100
So far, only one jurisdiction in the United States has adopted a voucher program
– Seattle. Under the program, each Seattle resident is eligible to receive four $25
“democracy vouchers,” which the resident may contribute to qualifying candidates, who
may then cash them in with Seattle’s elections agency for public funds.101 The program
was adopted by the city’s voters in 2015, and first used in 2017 for two city-wide at-large
council races and in the election for city attorney. The winning candidates in all three
races qualified for vouchers, as did the principal runners-up in the council races. And
voucher proceeds accounted for a majority of total individual contributions in the council
elections and a majority of the contributions to the winner of the city attorney race.
According to the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission, the introduction of vouchers
increased the number of residents contributing, lowered the size of the average
contribution, increased the percentage of contributions coming from within Seattle, and
spread the sources of contributions “more equitably” across the city’s neighborhoods.102
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Each type of public funding program has its own strengths and weaknesses. Small
donor multi-match and voucher programs are better than clean money’s flat grant at
increasing public participation in the campaign finance process. On the other hand, clean
money is better at freeing candidates from the burdens of fundraising. Voucher programs
enable each resident to determine which candidates get his or her public funds, but that
is also true of small-donor matching. With vouchers, there is considerable uncertainty as
to how many residents will actually donate their vouchers and when they will do so. It
appears that in the first Seattle election in which vouchers were used, only about 4% were
contributed to an office-seeker and most were returned just before the election, which
could limit their usefulness to candidates.103 It may be that the differences across
jurisdictions in the specific provisions of a category of program are as important as the
differences in the types of programs.104 But studies of these systems do indicate that a
properly crafted public financing program can draw the participation of viable candidates,
provide them with sufficient funding, and increase both the competitiveness of elections
and the funding role of ordinary voters.
IV.

Toward A Better Financing System
The presidential nomination public funding program created in 1974 played an

important role in sustaining competition and reducing dependence on large donors for
more than two decades, but it is effectively moribund. There have been calls for its outright
abolition.105 Instead, it should be restored to life. But any new system must draw on the
lessons learned from the collapse of the old, we well as from the experiences of the many
state and local public funding programs. Most importantly, the campaign finance system
must be attuned to the structure of the nomination process and the concerns of the
candidates who participate in it.
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First, public funds must be provided on a timely basis. The provision of the 1974
law delaying the first payment until the start of the election year is entirely out-of-step with
the calendar of today’s nomination process. Payments should be available throughout the
year preceding the year of the election. Second, and relatedly, the state-specific spending
limits make no sense in what has become essentially a national election in which the
importance of the early states is often far out of proportion to their voting population. Third,
the system must provide enough money to sustain a viable campaign so that it is more
attractive to serious candidates than the private funding route. It is hard to say exactly
what that amount should be, but it is surely far more than the $24 million funding cap that
applied in 2016. It is almost certainly more than $100 million, and $200 million could be
appropriate. Of course, not every candidate should receive that much public money. The
amount any candidate receives should reflect her seriousness as a candidate, which may
be measured by her success in grass-roots fundraising or the votes she obtains in
primaries and caucuses. The law could also certainly raise the initial conditions for
eligibility above the minimal fundraising threshold set in 1974, and index that level to
inflation thereafter.
Finally, candidates should not be required to accept spending limits as a condition
for public funds. Spending limits are counterproductive. As long as candidates with
access to their own personal wealth or the fundraising of high-dollar bundlers are free to
rely on private funding without limits, and as long as independent groups are also free to
raise and spend money without limits – and current constitutional doctrine indicates that
these conditions are likely to obtain for the foreseeable future – spending limits will
disadvantage publicly-funded candidates and are likely to discourage serious candidates
who can raise substantial private funds from participating in a public funding program.
Public funding can achieve its goals of increasing electoral competitiveness and reducing
the role of large donors without spending limits.
That does not mean that public funding should be unlimited. A workable system
could include a sizeable public grant – allotted on a small-donation-multiple-match basis
– up to a maximum amount, with candidates who reach that ceiling free to raise and spend
additional private contributions, perhaps limited to low-dollar donations. Such a program
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would lower barriers to entry for candidates without access to large donors and provide
incentives to reaching out widely to small donors, without handicapping participating
candidates’ ability to compete against their privately funded opponents.
H.R. 1 – the “For the People Act of 2019” – passed by the House of
Representatives in March 2019 provides an appropriate model. Proposed to take effect
with the 2028 presidential election, it would provide qualifying candidates a 6-to-1 match
for the first $200 of contributions received from any individual, up to a maximum of $250
million, subject to future cost-of-living indexation. There would be no spending limit for
publicly-funded candidates; however, the candidate would have to agree to accept no
more than $1,000 in the aggregate from any donor. H.R. 1 contains many other specific
limitations and requirements dealing with the financing of nomination campaigns that
would need to be considered, and in any event it is unlikely to be taken up by the Senate
or signed by the President any time soon. But it does lay out some of the elements that
are critical to a successful public financing program.
As young Senator Biden recognized in 1974, public financing is “not a cure-all for
all the ills besetting our present political system.”106 But a viable public financing program
for the presidential nomination process could address the concerns about political
inequality and wealth-based barriers to electoral competition that he raised more than
four decades ago and that continue to remain troubling features of our political system.
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